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NATURAL MONOPOLY AND CONTESTED 
MARKETS: SOME EXPERIMENTAL 
RESULTS* 
DON COURSEY 
University of Wyoming 
R. MARK ISAAC and VERNON L. SMITH 
University of Arizona 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE concept of natural monopoly is one of the most familiar in econom- 
ics. Most textbook descriptions are similar to that of Mansfield: 
. . [A] firm may become a monopolist because the average cost of producing the 
product reaches a minimum at an output rate that is big enough to satisfy the 
entire market at a price that is profitable. In a situation of this sort, if there is more 
than one firm producing the product, each must be producing at a higher-than- 
minimum level of average cost. Each may be inclined to cut the price to increase 
its output rate and reduce its average costs. The result is likely to be economic 
warfare-and the survival of a single victor, the monopolist.' 
Many supposed natural monopolies are the object of widespread state, 
local, and federal regulation. It was in addressing issues of public utility 
regulation that Demsetz laid the foundation for an alternative scenario for 
decreasing cost markets.2 In a model of rivals offering goods or services 
through a bidding process, Demsetz says: 
Economies of scale in production imply that the bids submitted will offer increas- 
ing quantities at lower per unit costs, but production scale economies imply noth- 
ing obvious about how competitive these prices will be. If one bidder can do the 
job at less than two or more, because each would then have a smaller output rate, 
then the bidder with the lowest bid price for the entire job will be awarded the 
* We wish to thank Dennis Carlton, Dan Alger, and an anonymous referee for helpful 
comments. Financial assistance provided by the NSF is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics: Theory and Application 255 (1970). 
2 Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J. Law & Econ. 55 (1968). 
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXVII (April 1984)] 
? 1984 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/84/2701-0001$01.50 
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contract, whether the good be cement, electricity, stamp vending machines, or 
whatever, but the lowest bid price need not be a monopoly price.3 
Demsetz's article promoted a debate over whether a formal auction 
system might provide a practical approach to monopoly control. This 
literature is rich in examining the practical difficulties of implementing 
such an institution.4 Recent work in the Demsetz tradition is embodied in 
what has been called the "contestable markets" theory. This literature 
argues that the forces Demsetz saw as disciplining price in a "natural 
monopoly" depend only on entry and do not require the implementation 
of a formal auctioneering mechanism. As Bailey has argued: 
[I]ts [the theory's] most dramatic results relate to natural monopoly. The theory 
pertains to markets which have substantial attributes of natural monopoly, but 
which are characterized by free and easy entry and exit. For such markets, the 
cost-minimizing market structure calls for a single seller, yet the theory asserts 
that these sellers are without monopoly power. In the case of contestable markets, 
potential entry or competition for the market disciplines behavior almost as effec- 
tively as would actual competition within the market. Thus, even if operated by a 
single firm, a market that can be readily contested performs in a competitive 
fashion.5 
In the typical description of the dynamics of natural monopoly theory, 
the single survivor of price cutting in a scale-economies environment 
operates as a true monopolist because the survivor gains the protection of 
alleged barriers to entry.6 Yet, several of the advocates of contestable 
markets hypotheses argue that it is not the economies of scale per se that 
pose an entry barrier. They suggest that only if the cost curves reflect 
3 Id. at 57. 
4 See, for example, Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in 
General and with respect to CATV, 7 Bell J. Econ. 73 (1976); and Martin Loeb & Wesley A. 
Magat, A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation, 22 J. Law & Econ. 399 (1979). 
5 Elizabeth E. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 
71 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 178 (1981). See also Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. 
Panzar, The Contestability of Airline Markets during the Transition to Deregulation, 44 Law 
& Contemp. Prob. 125 (1981); William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk 
Costs, Entry Barriers, and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q. J. Econ. 405 (1981); William J. 
Baumol, John C. Panzar, & Robert D. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of 
Industry Structure (1982); and William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the 
Theory of Industry Structure, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (1982). 
6 A representative example from an undergraduate text is the following quote from James 
P. Quirk, Intermediate Microeconomics 260 (1st ed. 1976): "Any prospective entrant faces 
the problem that the monopolist can squeeze him out by lowering price in the short run to 
the level where the entrant takes losses only to raise the price again to the monopoly level 
once the entrant has been bankrupted." 
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large sunk fixed costs already borne by the incumbent can the incumbent 
firm even be assumed to be advantaged over potential entrants.7 
The important characteristic of the contestable markets hypothesis, as 
we interpret it, is that at least two firms bid, in the sense of Demsetz, 
directly for buyer purchases. Note that we do not mean that at least two 
firms bid for the alienable right to supply a particular market as a monopo- 
list. In this latter case, monopoly is cast in the concrete of law, and 
bidding merely permits the owner of the auctioned right (the city, U.S. 
Treasury, and so on) to capture all the monopoly rents. Under our bidding 
interpretation we refer (as does Demsetz) to a free and open right to 
supply, with the market's being won by the lowest price bidder. This 
bidding could occur within a formal auction process or through the un- 
structured price announcements of firms who are actual or potential ri- 
vals. 
Much of the research in the area of contestable markets deals explicitly 
and directly with the applicability of the contestable markets hypothesis 
to questions of public regulatory policy.8 The current economic and polit- 
ical climate suggests that questions relating to the deregulated perfor- 
mance of currently or historically regulated markets are of continuing 
concern. The acceptability and/or applicability of the contestable markets 
hypothesis may play an important role in the regulatory future of indus- 
tries such as trucking, communications, and banking. For example, the 
chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) is reported to 
favor a requirement that truckers relinquish any unused operating per- 
mits.9 The existence of unused permits in any particular market, however, 
is essential if the market is to be contested with a minimum of regulatory 
delay. The purpose of our research is to examine both the natural monop- 
oly and the contestable markets hypotheses using appropriately designed 
laboratory experiments. 
In Section IV we report four experiments, each with a single seller (the 
"monopoly" case), in which the effective cost of entry for a second firm 
is infinite and six experiments, each with two potential sellers (the 
"duopoly" case), whose cost of entry is zero. Originally we planned to do 
7 See, for example, Bailey, supra note 5, at 178-79; Bailey & Panzar, supra note 5, at 
128-29; Baumol & Willig, supra note 5, at 418-19. Quirk, supra note 6, also makes the point 
about sunk costs in the second edition of the textbook, at 310. 
8 Especially Bailey, supra note 5; Bailey & Panzar, supra note 5; and Baumol, supra 
note 5. 
9 Business Week, November 9, 1981, reports at 74, "ICC sources say Taylor ordered his 
aides to draft a position paper advocating that truckers relinquish all operating rights not 
being used." 
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only four duopoly experiments, but the results of two of our first four 
duopolies (posted offer experiments 37 and 48) were not as unequivocal as 
the other two (45 and 47). Consequently, we expanded the sample size 
with two additional duopoly experiments (51 and 52). In all experiments 
all firms have identical decreasing marginal costs to capacity, and the 
capacity output of any firm is sufficient to satisfy the entire market de- 
mand. The price mechanism employed is a multiperiod posted offer mar- 
ket (explained in the next section), in which sellers quote public offers and 
buyers privately select the sellers from whom units are purchased. In the 
duopoly experiments each seller has an equal and unrestricted right to the 
market with each seller's market share determined by the buyers who are 
free to choose between the two posted price offers. 
One of the principal tasks of the research has been to state correctly 
and explicitly the predictions of the contestable markets hypothesis in the 
context of our experimental design. This hypothesis can be interpreted in 
both "strong" and "weak" forms. It could be interpreted as suggesting 
that the existence of two identical potential sellers is enough to bring forth 
competitive price and quantity. Or, in a slightly weaker version applicable 
to experimental markets, the markets might converge to the competitive 
outcomes across time. On the other hand, such requirements might be too 
strong. After all, in the more familiar realm of nondecreasing cost indus- 
tries, there are innumerable nonmonopoly predictions of duopoly behav- 
ior that also differ from purely competitive outcomes. Similar "inter- 
mediate" behavior might be observed in a contested decreasing cost 
duopoly. Thus, both a weak and a strong version of the contestable mar- 
kets hypothesis will be derived in Section IV. 
We next note that the contestable markets hypothesis (in either ver- 
sion) is falsifiable within our experimental design. There are at least two 
types of observed behavior that would lead to a failure of the hypothesis. 
First, the duopolists might use the vehicle of price signaling to establish a 
tacitly coordinated "shared monopoly." In our experimental design there 
is a strong incentive for such coordination, since the maximum profit to be 
shared by such a strategy is nearly $94 over twenty-five decision periods. 
If the duopolists were to "take turns" charging the monopoly price, each 
would pocket $47. Second, the duopolists may be found to behave in a 
manner suggested by the earlier reported description of the more tradi- 
tional natural monopoly arguments. In our design, a seller who serves the 
entire market may still just break even at a low competitive price with all 
demand revealed. If sellers post identical prices and split the market, 
losses may be incurred. Either firm, fearful of such losses in a contested 
market, could prefer zero profits with certainty by conceding the entire 
market to the rival. (Of course, nothing in this version of the traditional 
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alternative to the contestable markets hypothesis predicts which firm will 
be the "survivor.") If either of these alternate patterns of behavior (a 
collusive shared monopoly or a surviving monopolist) yields outcomes 
different from competitive predictions, then the contestable markets hy- 
pothesis is falsifiable in our design. This raises an important subsidiary 
question: What is the single uncontested seller (monopoly) outcome in 
this decreasing cost design? Comparing the behavior of contested markets 
only with theoretical monopoly predictions could be misleading. It is not 
self-evident that a single seller or collusive sellers facing unknown de- 
mand and profit motivated buyers will in fact be able to achieve the 
theoretical monopoly outcomes. If the results of the duopoly experiments 
are significantly different from theoretical monopoly predictions, this 
might be caused not by the contesting of the market but rather by some 
other feature of this cost and demand environment, such as a strategic 
decision by one or more buyers to underreveal demand. 
The four true monopoly experiments (34-36, 46), in which it is common 
knowledge that there is only one actual or potential seller, serve as the 
monopoly behavior standard for comparison with the contested duopoly 
results. It might be thought that the results of a monopoly experiment 
would be trivially unsurprising with price and output converging quickly 
to the monopoly equilibrium. Such an assumption confuses the condition 
of monopoly (one uncontested seller) with monopoly behavior. Actual 
monopolists, like our experimental monopolists, do not know their de- 
mand functions except as demand is revealed at quoted prices by the free 
choice of buyers. Monopoly theory assumes implicitly that all buyers 
reveal 100 percent of their demand and that the seller optimally restricts 
supply. Smith reports the results of nine increasing-cost monopoly experi- 
ments (using five buyers) conducted under the double auction, offer auc- 
tion, posted bid, and posted offer pricing institutions.'0 The one posted 
offer experiment that was reported converged quickly to the monopoly 
equilibrium with no buyer's withholding demand. In all the other institu- 
tions, prices and allocations failed to achieve monopoly levels and in 
many cases converged to levels near the competitive equilibrium because 
of successful buyer signaling and underrevelation of demand. This sug- 
gests that the posted offer institution is more likely than the other institu- 
tions to achieve a monopoly equilibrium, but such a generalization from 
10 Vernon L. Smith, An Empirical Study of Decentralized Institutions of Monopoly Re- 
straint, in Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics in Honor of Emanuel T. Weiler 
(1914-1979), at 83 (James P. Quirk & George Horwich eds. 1981); and Vernon L. Smith, 
Reflections on Some Experimental Market Mechanisms for Classical Environments, in Re- 
search in Marketing, Supplement 1: Choice Models for Buyer Behavior 13 (L. McAlister ed. 
1982). 
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the result of one experiment is not justified. Even if the reported result is 
replicable, we do not know whether it extends to the decreasing-cost 
case. Hence, the need for a rigorous empirical test of the single-seller 
monopoly hypothesis which could be falsified by persistent strategic 
underrevelation of demand by buyers, or a failure of the seller to price 
optimally, or some other unanticipated feature of this design. 
Table 1 lists all possible outcome combinations in each of the two 
(monopoly, duopoly) market types on the assumptions that a (price, quan- 
tity) observation is counted as supporting either the theoretical monopoly 
or competitive predictions. For example, an outcome (price or quantity) 
might be counted as "competitive" support if it is closer to the competi- 
tive than monopoly predictions. (Notice that this implies that, for pur- 
poses of this table, we have ignored the distinction between the strong 
and weak forms of the contestable markets hypothesis.) Of the four price- 
quantity, monopoly-competitive combinations in each of the two market 
types, one (competitive quantity/monopoly price) is impossible. A neces- 
sary condition for confirming (that is, nonfalsifying) either the standard 
monopoly theory (in the single seller design) or the contestable markets 
hypothesis (in the duopoly design) is that demand be fully revealed. The 
standard monopoly result requires supply restriction by the single seller, 
while the contestable markets hypothesis requires that at least one 
duopolist fully serve the market at the competitive price. 
II. THE PLATO POSTED OFFER PROCEDURE 
Most retail markets are organized under what has been called the 
posted offer institution." As we define it, in this institution each seller 
independently posts a take-it-or-leave-it price at which deliveries will be 
made in quantities elected by each individual buyer subject to seller ca- 
pacity limits. These posted prices may be changed or reviewed fre- 
quently, infrequently, regularly, or irregularly, but in any case a central 
characteristic of this mechanism is that the posted price is not subject to 
negotiation. 
The experiments reported here use the posted offer mechanism pro- 
grammed for the PLATO computer system by Jonathan Ketcham.12 This 
program allows subject buyers and sellers, sitting separately at PLATO 
terminals, to trade for a maximum of twenty-five market "days" or pric- 
" Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith, An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange 
Institutions, 45 Rev. Econ. Stud. 133 (1978). 
12 Jonathan Ketcham, Vernon L. Smith, & Arlington W. Williams, A Comparison of 
Posted Offer and Double Auction Pricing Institutions, 51 Rev. Econ. Stud. (1984), in press. 
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TABLE 1 
A CLASSIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE EXPERIMENTAL OUTCOMES AND 
POSSIBLE TYPES OF BEHAVIOR 
Alternative Outcome Possible Behavior Comment 
True Monopoly (Single Seller; Infinite Entry Cost) 
M1 Mp, B: Demand fully re- Does not falsify traditional 
Mq vealed monopoly theory 
S: Supply optimally re- 
stricted 
M2 Cp, B: Demand under re- Falsifies traditional mo- 
Mq vealed nopoly theory 
S: Supply restricted 
M3 Cp, B: Demand revealed Falsifies traditional mo- 
Cq S: Supply unrestricted nopoly theory 
Contestable Markets Hypothesis Duopoly (Two Firms, Zero Entry Cost) 
Cl Mp B: Demand fully re- Falsifies CMH, a "Natural 
Mq vealed Monopoly" type of out- 
S: Supply optimally re- come 
stricted by either 
i) tacit collusion of 
2 firms, or 
ii) a "surviving" 
monopolist is 
ceded the market 
C2 Cp B: Demand under re- Falsifies CMH 
Mq vealed 
S: Supply restricted by 
either 
i) tacit collusion of 
2 firms, or 
ii) a "surviving" 
monopolist is 
ceded the market 
C3 Cp B: Demand revealed Does not falsify CMH 
Cq S: Supply unrestricted 
at the competitive 
price by at least one 
firm 
NOTE.-Mp: Price supports theoretical monopoly prediction; Mq: Quantity supports theoretical mo- 
nopoly prediction; C,: Price supports theoretical competitive prediction; Cq: Quantity supports theoret- ical competitive prediction; B: Buyers; S: Seller(s); CMH: Contestable markets hypothesis. 
ing periods. The display screen for each subject shows his or her record 
sheet, which lists a maximum of five units that can be purchased (sold) in 
each period. For each unit, the buyer (seller) has a marginal valuation 
(cost) which represents the value (cost) to him or her of purchasing (sell- 
ing) that unit. These controlled, strictly private unit valuations (costs) 
induce individual, and aggregate market, theoretical supply and demand 
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schedules.13 That is, in an experiment, buyers (sellers) earn cash rewards 
equal to the difference between the marginal value (selling price) of a unit 
and its purchase price (marginal cost). Sales are "to order" in the sense 
that there are no penalties, or carry-over inventories, associated with 
units not sold (or units not purchased). Consequently the assigned mar- 
ginal valuations and costs induce well-defined flow supply and demand 
conditions. 
Each period begins with a request that sellers select a price offer by 
typing a price into the computer keyset. This offer is displayed privately 
on the seller's screen. The seller is then asked to select a corresponding 
quantity to be made available at that offer price. The maximum number of 
units a seller can offer corresponds to the number of the last unit whose 
cost is not greater than the offer price. The minimum number of units a 
seller can offer corresponds to the number of the first unit whose cost is 
not greater than the offer price. (However, the seller is required to offer at 
least one unit; that is, a seller cannot post a price for zero units.) This 
procedure permits individual-induced marginal costs to be declining, con- 
stant, or increasing. If the seller faces declining marginal costs, as in the 
experiments reported below, these minimum and maximum quantity con- 
straints prevent his choices from being such that a loss is guaranteed, but 
if price is below the first unit marginal cost, a loss will be taken on the first 
units sold that must be more than offset by profits on later units if an 
overall profit is to be earned in the period. Since it is costly in time and 
effort for a seller to calculate the profit that any given offer may provide, 
especially with declining costs, PLATO always informs the seller of the 
potential profit (loss) if all offered units are sold. When a seller is satisfied 
with the selected price and quantity, he presses a touch sensitive "offer 
box" displayed on the screen. This action places, irrevocably, that 
seller's offer in the market. Before touching the offer box the seller may 
change the price and/or quantity as many times as desired. Each seller 
learns his competitor's price, in the current period, only after each has 
entered his price into the market. 
The screen viewed by the buyer displays one price box for accepting 
units offered by each seller. After all sellers have entered their offers, 
each seller's price is posted in these buyers' acceptance boxes and at the 
bottom of each seller's screen. PLATO then randomly orders the buyers in 
a buying sequence, and the first is informed that he may now purchase the 
good. A buyer, once selected, can purchase from any seller. To purchase 
a unit from a selected seller, the buyer presses the box corresponding to 
13 See Vernon L. Smith, Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory, 66 Am. Econ. 
Rev. Papers & Proc. 274 (1976). 
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that seller, then depresses a "confirm" key on the keyset. Repeating this 
sequence causes a second unit to be purchased, and so on. A buyer is 
allowed to purchase up to his buying capacity from any seller or sellers. 
However, a buyer can neither purchase a unit whose price is greater than 
the unit's marginal valuation nor buy from a seller who has sold all of the 
units offered. When a seller's last available unit is sold the price appearing 
in the buyer's box for that seller is replaced with the message "out of 
stock" on the buyer's screen. After the first buyer has finished making 
purchases, the next buyer in random order may begin purchasing, and so 
on. The period ends when the last buyer completes this buying mode and 
price posting for the next period begins. 
Thus, the posted offer mechanism captures the essential feature of the 
Bailey and Panzar models in that the actual allocation of sales to firms is 
made by the buyers themselves and not by an auctioneer or regulatory 
intermediary. 
It is important to emphasize that buyers and sellers have only limited 
information. All unit values (costs) assigned to individual buyers (sellers) 
are strictly private, known only to the subject (and the experimenter). 
Each buyer sees all of the seller's price offers but not the quantities 
available at these prices. In the experiments reported below sellers do not 
see the price posted by other sellers in the current period until after each 
has entered his own final price selection for that period. Finally, buyers 
(sellers) know only their own purchases (sales) and profits. Nevertheless, 
something less than a perfectly noncooperative setting exists. With each 
seller seeing the prices posted by other sellers in all previous periods, 
some indirect communication (or "price signaling") can be attempted. 
Such signaling has been observed in previous posted offer markets but 
has not proven to be very successful in effecting collusion.14 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We report ten experiments-four with a single seller and six with two 
sellers. The duopoly sellers are each given marginal cost schedules identi- 
cal with the schedules given to the monopoly sellers (except perhaps for a 
parameter-disguising constant added to all unit costs and values). The 
aggregate demand and individual marginal cost schedules are shown on 
the left of Figure 1. We define the competitive equilibrium quantity, Qc, as 
the largest quantity that can be sold without loss by at least one seller 
(that is, where average cost is less than or equal to price, or AC (Qc) : D 
(Qc)). Since demand is sufficient to satisfy no more than one seller at 
14 See Ketcham, Smith, & Williams, supra note 12. 
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capacity sales, Qc = 10, whether there is one seller or two. Any price 
which supports Qc is a competitive equilibrium price. In our experimental 
design any Pc E [AC(10), AC(10) + .12] is a competitive equilibrium price. 
The individual unit marginal valuations, marginal costs, and average costs 
are shown in Table 2, measured in deviations from AC(10). 
All five buyers in each experiment had participated in at least one 
previous posted offer experiment, but with design parameters different 
from the experiments reported here. Since the PLATO posted offer mecha- 
nism provides for a maximum trading capacity of five units for each agent 
(a screen display limitation) each monopoly experiment was initialized as 
if there were "two" sellers (each duopoly as if there were "four" sellers). 
Then each subject seller was provided two adjacent terminals. The fact 
that the markets actually consisted of one or two sellers (not two or four) 
was known to all participants. 
Some of the parameter implications of this design for both monopoly 
and duopoly are summarized in Table 3.15 Note that if a firm posts the 
monopoly price, and if it is the only firm or this is the lowest price, then 
the seller makes a profit of $3.75 in the period. Each seller has an incen- 
tive to post a lower price if he thinks the other seller will post any given 
price above P = 0. If the two sellers post the same price, one of the two 
sellers may incur a loss depending on how buyers choose to divide their 
purchases. If buyers are egalitarian and divide their purchases equally, 
then both sellers incur losses at tied prices below $0.75. Because of the 
scale economies, there is a social loss if either firm satisfies less than 100 
percent of the demand at any ruling price. 
It is worth reemphasizing at this point the methodological approach of 
this design. We have attempted to insure that the duopoly markets exhibit 
as few potential barriers to entry or competition as possible, except for 
those that derive from the natural monopoly nature of the cost functions 
of the two sellers. Bailey and Panzar report on their theory as follows: 
"5 The use of two PLATO terminals required us to alter their parameters slightly under 
certain unusual conditions. The sellers' profits in each of the periods consisted of the sum of 
the profits on the first five units (left terminal) and on the next five units (right terminal). This 
addition was done by hand and not internally in PLATO. Because of the decreasing costs, 
sellers typically lost money on some early units and made money on the later ones. By a 
coincidence of the experimental design, prices at or below the upper bound of the competi- 
tive price range guaranteed a loss on the first five units, tripping the internal filter in the 
PLATO program designed to keep persons from guaranteeing themselves a monetary loss in 
the period. To correct this, we lowered the cost of the fifth unit by 25 cents if and only if a 
seller attempted to enter a price in the competitive price range. This intramarginal change in 
rent had only one effect on the parameters or predictions of the model: by lowering average 
cost, it dropped the lower bound of the competitive price range by 2.5 cents for persons 
trading in that range. The upper competitive price, the competitive quantity, and the monop- 
oly price and quantity predictions were unchanged. 
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TABLE 2 
INDUCED INDIVIDUAL VALUES AND COSTS 
UNIT 
AGENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Buyer 1 2.37 .12 - .88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Buyer 2 2.12 .37 - .13 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Buyer 3 1.87 .62 - .63 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Buyer 4 1.62 .87 - .38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Buyer 5 1.37 1.12 -1.13 
Seller 1 1.12 .87 .62 .37 .12 -.13 -.38 -.63 -.88 -1.13 
Average cost 1.12 1.00 .87 .75 .62 .50 .37 .25 .12 0 
NOTE.-All values and costs are stated in deviations from AC(10). 
z: 
O 
z 
0" o 
oi 
o 
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TABLE 3 
PARAMETER SUMMARY, MONOPOLY AND DUOPOLY 
Parameter Description Value 
Number of buyers 5 
Monopoly price (normalized) 1.12 
Seller surplus (per period) at P = 1.12 3.75 
Buyer surplus (per period) at P = 1.12 3.75 
Competitive price (normalized) [0, .12] 
Seller surplus (per period) at P = 0 0 
Buyer surplus (per period) at P = 0 12.50 
"The theory of contestable markets has been developed to analyze the 
equilibrium properties of markets that may have economies of scale but 
that are characterized by perfectly free and easy entry and exit."16 In 
testing this theory, we have attempted to reproduce these conditions 
specified by the theory. If the theory is falsified, we are done; that is, no 
further experiments are necessary. If the theory is not falsified, a wide 
range of questions opens about the robustness of the assumptions behind 
the contestable markets hypothesis. This would call for further study by 
theoretical, empirical, and experimental economists into the limits of con- 
testing as a discipline against monopoly behavior. 
IV. HYPOTHESES AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The contestable markets hypotheses presented in the introduction can 
be formalized in a manner conducive to laboratory experimentation. 
Define a vector (P, Q, E) as price, quantity, and market efficiency. The 
theoretical competitive equilibrium predictions, (Pc, Qc, Ec), and the 
theoretical monopoly equilibrium predictions, (Pm, Qm, Em), are constant 
vectors given by economic theory. From the actual laboratory experi- 
ments come vectors describing laboratory monopolies, (Ps, Qs, Es), and 
duopolies (Pd, Qd, Ed). These results could and did vary over the course of 
the experiments. 
We define a laboratory strong version of the contestable markets hy- 
pothesis in terms of convergence of the duopoly results over time to the 
competitive predictions: 
Hs: (Pd, Qd, Ed) -> (Pc, Qc, Ec) 
Hs: (Pd, Qd, Ed) _ (Pc, Qc, Ec). 
16 Bailey & Panzar, supra note 5, at 125. 
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There is also a weak interpretation of the contestable markets hy- 
pothesis. The laboratory duopolies could exhibit neither monopoly nor 
competitive behavior, but some intermediate outcome. While the market 
is not a true "closed" monopoly, the two sellers may each have some 
market power that is not eliminated by the contestability of the market. 
The following is a formal statement of a weak version of the contestable 
markets hypothesis: 
H,:Pd m 
+ P 
2 
Pm + Pc Qd 2 
Ed Em 
+ Ec 
2 
versus 
HI,: Pd> P + P 
Qd m + Qc 
Ed< 
2 
d < 
Em + Ec 
2 
That is, if the weak version of the competitive markets hypothesis fails, 
then the duopolies will be achieving outcomes closer to the monopoly 
than to the competitive predictions. Such behavior could be manifested 
by a single monopoly survivor, by a shared monopoly, or by some kind of 
rotating monopoly behavior. 
On the other hand, a monopolist may not be able to exercise complete 
monopoly power within a market. It is important to separate competitive 
pressure due to factors of contestability from any underlying weakness 
with respect to the applicability of theoretical monopoly predictions. 
Therefore, we next define an ordering hypothesis that requires that labo- 
ratory contestable duopoly markets actually perform more competitively 
than laboratory monopolies: 
P + 
Pc Ho: Pd sP 2 
Qd> s + Oc 2 
Ed Es + Ec 2 
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versus 
P+PC HO: Pd > Ps 
Qd <Q+Q 2 
Ed : Ed + Ec 2 
Figure 1 charts the lowest ruling price and the quantity traded in each 
period for the ten experiments.17 Figure 2 charts the mean monopoly and 
mean duopoly prices computed for all experiments in each treatment. 
Table 4 summarizes the mean price, quantity, efficiency, and the index of 
monopoly effectiveness (the proportion of theoretical monopoly profit 
actually realized by the seller(s)).'8 
The most striking feature of these results is the overwhelming support 
they give at least to the weak version of the contestable markets hy- 
pothesis. Mean duopoly price is closer to the competitive price than the 
17 In 46, the monopolist entered a price in trading period 20 that he later said was acciden- 
tally and incorrectly $1.00 lower than he wanted. 
18 Complete copies of the data protocols for all experiments are available from the au- 
thors. 
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TABLE 4 
MEAN QUANTITY, EFFICIENCY, AND INDEX OF MONOPOLY EFFECTIVENESS BY PERIOD 
Mean Mean 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Monopoly Monopoly 
Quantity, Quantity, Efficiency Efficiency Effectiveness Effectiveness 
Period Monopoly Duopoly Monopoly Duopoly Monopoly Duopoly 
1 3.50 7.70 44.67 76.67 .42 .53 
2 5.00 7.70 46.00 76.67 .57 .53 
3 5.75 8.20 57.50 81.67 .62 .51 
4 6.00 7.80 58.00 75.50 .59 .36 
5 6.25 7.80 60.50 76.00 .64 .39 
6 6.75 8.20 67.50 79.30 .71 .43 
7 6.50 8.30 64.50 79.30 .60 .38 
8 6.75 8.80 67.50 76.50 .66 .37 
9 6.25 8.70 62.50 83.80 .68 .33 
10 6.25 9.00 59.00 82.15 .70 .09 
11 6.25 9.00 61.50 88.70 .60 .36 
12 6.25 9.30 61.00 90.30 .57 .35 
13 6.75 9.20 65.50 85.50 .59 .34 
14 6.75 9.30 66.50 76.90 .56 - .14 
15 6.00 9.20 56.00 86.50 .69 .10 
16 6.00 9.30 59.00 93.30 .77 .30 
17 5.25 9.00 51.00 81.20 .59 - .06 
18 5.00 9.30 49.00 85:50 .56 .02 
Theoretical 6.00 10.00 60.00 100.00 1.00 (0 to .3625) 
z 
C- 
0 
z 
0 
0 
0 
o
C" 
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monopoly price at period 1 and tends to decay thereafter. Mean duopoly 
quantity follows a similar pattern after period 5. Only in efficiency are the 
results not so clear cut. Mean duopoly efficiency is never as low as 60 
percent, and in nine of the final ten periods it is closer to the competitive 
than monopoly level. The efficiency time path is more erratic than the 
quantity dimension because of several ties in pricing in which both firms 
supply the market at inefficiently low output levels. 
In period 18, the last period for which data are available for all experi- 
ments, the market performance vectors are as follows:9 
Duopoly Monopoly Competitive Monopoly 
Mean Mean Theory Theory 
Price .182 1.0425 (0, .12) (1.12 or 1.37) 
Quantity 9.3 5.00 10.0 (6.0 or 5.0 ) 
Efficiency 85.5 49.00 100.0 (60.0 or 50.00) 
The data are almost, but not quite, as convincing with regard to the 
strong version of the contestable market hypothesis. We state this reser- 
vation primarily because of the bifurcated nature of the data (see Figure 
1). Four duopoly experiments had price and quantity outcome that con- 
verged directly to the competitive predictions. For these, the strong ver- 
sion of the hypothesis clearly holds. The other two duopoly experiments 
never achieved the competitive outcomes, although a visual inspection 
suggests they were tending in that direction. To test whether these experi- 
ments actually demonstrated convergent tendencies, we estimated the 
following regressions: 
In P, = Ao + Alt + Ut, 
where Pt was the normalized price above the top of the competitive set in 
period t; Ao, and AI are coefficients, AI being a decay parameter; and U, is 
the error term. Ordinary least squares on the twenty-five observations of 
both experiment 37 and experiment 48 yielded the following results (t- 
statistics in parentheses), 
for 37: 
In Pt = -0.3813 -0.0258 t; (-8.08) (-8.14) 
19 Dan Alger of the FTC pointed out to us after work on this research had begun that there 
are actually two points at which monopoly profits obtained. One, the lower of the two, is the 
one we had designated as Pm. The other is at Pm + .25, which may explain the tendency of 
two of the monopoly experiments to evince several periods of pricing near this point. 
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for 48: 
In P, = -0.58 -0.025 t; 
(-7.54) (-4.88) 
(48 adjusted for autocorrelation: 
In P, -0.5836 -0.0240 t). 
(-4.55) (-2.85) 
The negative coefficient on the time variable (with significant -statistic) 
in each equation suggests that price in these two experiments decayed 
toward the competitive range at the rate of about 2.5 percent per period, 
thus supporting the laboratory-markets version of the strong contestable 
markets hypothesis. 
It is necessary to examine these results, which support the competitive 
markets hypothesis, in the light of the behavior of true single-seller mar- 
kets. The importance of this comparison is in seeing whether our conclu- 
sions of competitive behavior stand when actual monopoly behavior is 
used as the benchmark. Again, the data are clear cut. Qualitatively, it can 
be seen that the mean duopoly price is more competitive than the mean 
monopoly price in eighteen out of eighteen periods; mean duopoly quan- 
tity is greater in eighteen of eighteen periods, and mean duopoly effi- 
ciency is greater in eighteen of eighteen periods. 
Two nonparametric tests were used to judge the robustness of the 
qualitative observation that contested duopolies are more competitive 
than the laboratory monopolies. First, a binomial cell test over the two 
intervals 
I1 
P > Pm 
+ Pc) 
and 
12: P< PM 
+ 
PC) 2 ' 
where PF is .12, the maximum of the competitive price range). All four 
period 18 monopoly prices fell in I, and all six duopoly prices fell in I2. 
This would occur with a probability of .00098 if generated from a random 
binomial process. Second, a nonparametric Mann and Whitney rank-sum 
test was conducted.20 This test checks the equality of the distribution of 
prices between the duopoly and monopoly experiments. A total of eigh- 
20 Alexander M. Mood & Franklin A. Graybill, Introduction to the Theory of Statistics 
(1974). 
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teen observation periods in each of the ten experiments yielded a sample 
of 180 observations. Using this sample, the hypothesis that the experi- 
mental duopoly prices and experimental monopoly prices arise from dif- 
ferent distributions can be accepted at the 99.99995 confidence level. In 
summary, the use of the observed monopoly data as a benchmark does 
not alter the conclusion that contestable decreasing-cost duopoly markets 
behave more competitively than uncontested monopoly counterparts. 
Parenthetically, these competitive results occurred in spite of what 
might be viewed as attempts to keep prices high by means of indirect price 
signaling. Across the six duopoly experiments, 47 percent of all posted 
offers were higher than the prevailing market price in the immediately 
previous market period. But in only 35 percent of these signaling attempts 
did the signaler's competitor follow through with a next-period offer price 
above the signaler's price.21 This was the anatomy of the failure of signals 
to yield tacit collusion. 
These experiments provided a related set of observations that proved to 
be very interesting. Even though contested duopolies are clearly different 
from the single seller counterparts, these laboratory monopolists did not 
automatically lock on the monopoly outcomes. Experiments 34 and 35 are 
particularly notable in this regard (see Figure 1). We observed that a 
principal problem facing the monopolists was the withholding of demand 
by buyers. Given the decreasing-cost schedule of our monopolists, with- 
holding of demand hits the seller at his most profitable units. Small 
amounts of withholding resulted in very large reductions in sellers' 
profits. Buyer withholding occurred at a much higher rate in the monop- 
oly experiments than in the duopoly experiments (9.14 percent versus 
21 The following table provides these data for each experiment: 
Incidence of Incidence of Signal 
Experiment Price Signals Reinforcement 
(A) (B) 
37 25/48 = .521 6/25 = .24 
45 9/26 = .346 3/9 = .33 
48 25/48 = .521 8/25 = .32 
47 12/34 = .353 4/12 = .33 
51 20/38 = .526 8/20 = .40 
52 16/34 = .471 8/16 = .50 
All 107/228 = .469 37/107 = .35 
Column A: Fraction of price offers by a seller which exceed the previous period's ruling 
price and are potentially profitable (signal). Column B: Fraction of "signals" in column A 
for which the signaler's competitor followed through in the subsequent period with an offer 
price above that of the signaler's price (signal reinforcement). 
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1.16 percent).22 This tended to discipline the monopolists against attempts 
to increase price. This discipline appeared to weaken in three of the four 
experiments as the experiment progressed beyond about fifteen periods 
(see Figure 1). These withholding effects have important applications in 
addressing the question, "How tough is it to be a monopolist?" Witness 
the following case of two segmented air-frame markets, one a contested 
duopoly, the other apparently serviced by only a single seller: 
Delta and other airlines, it's known, had been pushing McDonnell Douglas to 
build a new plane, if only to spur price competition with Boeing. Until yesterday's 
announcement, just 52 of the narrow-body 757s had been purchased, as airlines 
held off to see whether Douglas would enter the fray. The plane Douglas has been 
considering is known as the DCXX, or ATMR, for Advanced Transport-Medium 
Range, and would compete directly with the 757. 
Meanwhile, Boeing's wide-body 767, which has competition in the form of the 
European Airbus Industrie A-310, has drawn orders for a healthy 161 aircraft. 
"Airlines know they get the best deal when two companies are aggressively going 
after their business," one industry source says.23 
Apparently, as in our laboratory markets, buyers displayed a greater 
tendency to withhold demand in the monopoly market than in the duopoly 
market. 
V. CONCLUSIONS, INTERPRETATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
The most significant conclusion of this research is that the behavioral 
predictions of the contestable market hypothesis are fundamentally cor- 
rect. It is simply not true that monopoly pricing is a "natural" result of a 
market merely because firms in the market exhibit decreasing costs and 
demand is sufficient to support no more than a single firm. 
The data from these experiments point toward an even stronger conclu- 
sion. There is clear evidence not only that contesting duopolies exhibit 
behavior more competitive than theoretical monopoly predictions, but 
also that they actually perform up to the standards of the competitive 
22 These data include all subjects in all six duopoly experiments with the exception of the 
final one, 52. In that experiment, a single buyer who showed no unusual buying behavior 
nevertheless was causing the experiment severe problems because of his tendency to play 
with the PLATO terminal keys in nonprescribed ways. He was excused (in period 3, after the 
market had already entered the competitive range) and replaced with a graduate student. 
The replacement was instructed to refrain from withholding demand. Such behavior makes a 
buyer essentially a passive participant and was virtually the universal pattern observed 
among buyers in the first five duopoly experiments (in which only 1.16 percent of all demand 
was withheld). However, because this replacement was so instructed, the data reported 
include only the other four buyers from experiment 52. 
23 Victor F. Zonana, Boeing's Sale to Delta Gives It Big Advantage over U.S. Competi- 
tors, Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1980, at 1. 
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model. Four of our six experiments moved rapidly to competitive out- 
comes; two others moved in that direction but never actually entered the 
competitive range. The fact that these results obtained with only two 
sellers is particularly convincing, since the most familiar paradigm sug- 
gests that adding more sellers (if it had any effect at all) would increase the 
competitive discipline of the marketplace. 
As we view it, the essential feature of a contested market is that firms 
bid directly for the purchases of buyers. If either of two sellers can satisfy 
the entire market, then the posted offer pricing institution reduces, in its 
essential features, to a sealed-bid auction in which the seller with the 
ruling bid collects a price equal to his bid for the entire market.24 Thus, 
given the market structure, sellers are bidding to supply a single unit, the 
market, as in a sealed-bid auction with two bidders competing for a single 
item. However, in this case the item won has a volume dimension that 
varies with the level of the ruling price. Also, in this case, the tie-breaking 
rule is discretionary, since it depends on the free choice made by each 
buyer. The usual tie-breaking rule in sealed-bid auctions is to make the 
award to one of the bidders at random (an equally likely choice). Note 
that such a rule is more efficient than the "buyer's discretion" rule in 
posted offer markets, since the random award rule guarantees the market 
to one seller. With increasing returns it is always better to have all sales 
made by one seller. 
The sealed-bid interpretation also provides a possible explanation of 
different modes of contested market behavior. As shown by Cox, Rober- 
son, and Smith, risk-averse buyers will bid more (sellers will bid less) than 
risk-neutral buyers (sellers) for an item sold (purchased) under the high 
(low) bid rule.25 Hence, greater risk aversion may account for the four 
contesting duopoly experiments that converged quickly to the competi- 
tive equilibrium. 
The comparison of our monopoly experiments with our contested mar- 
ket experiments suggests that the contesting of the markets (and not some 
other feature of our design) was responsible for the competitive tenden- 
cies in the latter. An examination of the monopoly experiment is particu- 
larly important since our experiments incorporated a finite numbr of hu- 
man buyers. This could leave open the possibility that the competitive 
discipline of the markets is due not directly to contesting by sellers but 
rather to the actual (or merely anticipated) strategic withholding of de- 
24 This analogy was pointed out in Plott & Smith, supra note 11. 
25 James C. Cox, Bruce Roberson, & Vernon L. Smith, Theory and Behavior of Single 
Object Auctions, in 2 Research in Experimental Economics 1 (Vernon L. Smith ed. 1982). 
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mand by buyers.26 The data presented here suggest that this is not the 
case. With a 9.14 percent buyer withholding of demand, the monopolists 
encountered some difficulty in obtaining prices at or near the monopoly 
level, primarily in the earlier periods. However, by the later periods of the 
experiment, average monopoly price was close to the predictions of the 
monopoly model. If this 9.14 percent rate of underrevelation did not 
ultimately prevent monopolists from obtaining prices at or near a monop- 
oly level, it suggests that it is unlikely that there was any significant effect 
from the much lower rate of underrevelation (1.16 percent) that occurred 
in the contested duopolies. 
Our research program on contestable markets will expand on the pres- 
ent study by (a) introducing finite nonzero entry costs, and (b) running 
some experiments in which "dummy" buyers are computer programmed 
to reveal demand, with this "full revelation" being known by sellers. The 
results of the present study indicate that experiments under a are needed 
to explore the entry cost limits of the contestable markets hypothesis. 
Experiments under b will allow us to examine further our current claim 
that the competitive tendencies in our duopoly experiments are indeed 
caused by sellers contesting the market. 
26 We wish to thank our referee for emphasizing that the contestable markets theory 
assumes a "large number" of buyers. 
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